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Peæaloza (J. of Math. Econ., 2009) modeled the functioning of real-time gross
settlement (RTGS) systems as an in￿nite dimensional linear programming prob-
lem and used duality theory to determine the shadow-prices of banks. Though he
proved the existence of optimal settlement rules in RTGS systems without cen-
tralized queueing facilities, he did not show how optimal settlements can be imple-
mented. In this paper, we show that the optimal settlement rule can be implemented
by an optimization routine involving reordering and spliting of payments. Such op-
timization routine is a no-queueing analog of the ￿rst-in-￿rst-out (FIFO) rule with
reordering used in many RTGS systems with queueing.
1 Introduction
Since the earlier 1990￿ s there has been a massive change in the design of payment
systems for wholesale transfers. Due to the increasing systemic risk inherent to deferred
net settlement systems, the Bank for International Settlements has recommended the
adoption of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems, in which interbank transfers are
settled on a gross basis as they arrive at the Central Bank (see BIS (1997) for very good
exposition of this theme). It is well known that RTGS systems do not economize on
systemic liquidity, for illiquidity is not allowed at any time, so banks have to hold too
much reserve money for settlement purposes.
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1Peæaloza (2009), based almost uniquely on the RTGS report by BIS (1997), showed
how to minimize liquidity idleness by modeling the optimal functioning of RTGS systems
as an in￿nite dimensional linear programming problem. He proved the existence of optimal
settlement rules and, in addition, used duality theory to determine personalized shadow-
prices of banks. He then used these shadow-prices to de￿ne a new measure of marginal
contagion (see Fur￿ne (1999) for an alternative, though quite di⁄erent, approach). His
model followed the steps ￿rst given by G￿ntzer et alii (1998), Leinonen & Soram￿ki
(1999), and Bech & Soram￿ki (2001). In his model there is no queueing facilities. In
other words, when a payment message is sent to the Central Bank and the sender does
not have enough funds to settle it, then the message is immediately returned. In most
modern RTGS systems, such a message is instead queued until the bank receives additional
funds from other sources.
In this paper we show that the optimal settlement rule can be implemented by an
optimization routine involving reordering and splitting of payments. Such an optimiza-
tion routine is a no-queueing analog of the ￿rst-in ￿rst-out (FIFO) settlement rule with
reordering widely adopted in RTGS systems with centralized queueing facilities. In sec-
tion 3 we show that the optimal settlement rule can be implemented by an optimization
routine involving reordering and spliting of payments. Such optimization routine is a no-
queueing analog of the ￿rst-in-￿rst-out (FIFO) rule with reordering used in many RTGS
systems with queueing. Section 4 concludes the paper. Our model makes a case for the
use of optimization routines such as reordering and splitting of payments.
2 Optimal RTGS systems
In this section we present the basic framework of the functional analytic structure
of payment systems as in Peæaloza (2009). The purpose of this section is to make the
reader familiar with his model of real-time gross settlement systems. We obviously refer
to Peæaloza (2009) for a complete presentation.
Let T = ([0;T];B([0;T]);￿) be a measure space representing the time interval (a
business day), where ￿ is the Lebesgue measure on the Borel-￿-algebra B([0;T]). Let
L1(￿) be the space of measurable bounded real functions on [0;T], endowed with the
sup-norm. Let (￿;=;￿) be a complete atomless probability space. The set B = f1;:::;ng
denotes the set of banks. Let xij(t;!) be the monetary value of the payment from bank i
to bank j recorded on the books of the Central Bank at time t and state !. Assume that
xij : [0;T]￿￿ ! [0;1) is a jointly measurable function such that xij(t;￿) 2 L1(￿)+, 8t 2
[0;T], and, xij(￿;!) 2 L1(￿)+, ￿ ￿ a:e: De￿ne the function xi : [0;T] ! L1(￿)n
+; where
L1(￿)n
+ = L1(￿;[0;1)n); by xi(t) = (xij(t))j2B, where xij(t) 2 L1(￿)+, 8t 2 [0;T]:
2Now de￿ne x by x = (xi)i2B: Given ‘ = n2, let E = L1(￿;R‘) be the space of integrable
functions with values in R‘, endowed with the weak topology, and let E￿ = L1(￿;R‘) be
its dual.1 Whenever f 2 E (or E￿), we assume that f = (f1;:::;fn) and fi = (fij)j2B:
Then, for each t 2 [0;T], x(t) 2 E￿ = L1(￿;R‘) and x 2 L1(￿;E￿). The space of
payments is the positive cone of the space of all Bochner-integrable functions2 that are
essentially bounded, where the norm is given by kxk = esssupfkx(t)k : t 2 [0;T]g:
When a bank sends an interbank payment message, the Central Bank immediately
checks whether the sending bank has su¢ cient funds. If it does, the payment is settled
with ￿nality. If it does not, the procedure depends on the design of the payment system.
If there is a centralized queueing facility, the message will be queued for later settlement.
If there is no queueing facility, then the message is returned. We assume there is no
centralized queueing facility. Consider the following set:
K = ff 2 E : f(!) 2 [0;1]
‘;￿ ￿ a:e: and fii(!) = 0;8! 2 ￿;8i 2 Bg:
Clearly, K ￿ E = L1(￿;R‘) is convex and nonempty. It is assumed that K is weakly
compact separable and metrizable for the relative topology induced from L1(￿;R‘), where
the metric on K is denoted by m, and uniformly integrable.
Let ￿i : [0;T] ! L1(￿;[0;1]n); be de￿ned by the array ￿i(t) = (￿ij(t))j2B, where
￿ij(t) 2 L1(￿;[0;1]), 8t 2 [0;T]: Let ‘ = n2. Assume3 that ￿ : [0;T] ! K is (B([0;T]);B(K))-
measurable, where B(K) is the Borel-￿-algebra generated by the relative weak topology
on K inherited from E. Let L1(￿;K) be the set of Bochner-integrable settlement func-
tions. We have that, for each t 2 [0;T], ￿(t) 2 E = L1(￿;R‘) and ￿ 2 L1(￿;E): A
settlement function is any Bochner-integrable function ￿ : [0;T] ! K.
On the dual pairing hL1(￿;E);L1(￿;E￿)i de￿ne:










Given the Banach space E = L1(￿;R‘) and its dual E￿ = L1(￿;R‘), we have that
￿ 2 L1(￿;E) denotes the settlement function, with the condition that ￿(t) 2 K; 8t 2
[0;T]: The space of settlement functions is endowed with the weak topology. In addition,
x 2 L1(￿;E￿) = (L1(￿;E))￿ denotes the payments function, which belongs to the dual
space, endowed with the weak￿ topology, and hL1(￿;E);L1(￿;E￿)i is the topological
1The space E is a locally convex, separable, metrizable linear topological space and that its topological
dual is E￿ = L1(￿;R‘):
2Given a ￿nite measure space (￿;z;￿) and a Banach space E, a ￿-measurable function f : ￿ ! E is
Bochner-integrable if, and only if,
R
￿ kfkd￿ < 1 .
3For ease of notation, we will use the isometric isomorphism L1(￿;[0;1]n)n ￿ L1(￿;[0;1]‘):
3dual pair denoting the duality between interbank payments and settlements with duality
bracket representing the expected total out￿ ow of interbank payments, x ￿ ￿:
Consider the set-valued map ￿ : [0;T] ￿ K ￿ K given by4:













+ ￿ Di(t;!) + zi(t;!);￿ ￿ a:e:;8t 2 [0;T];8i 2 Bg
Here, Bi
o is the initial balance of bank i at its Central Bank account. The function
￿ Di denotes the net debit cap for bank i. It is a source of liquidity o⁄ered by the Central
Bank to bank i. The overall e⁄ect of a net debit cap is that bank i is allowed to incur
temporary intraday overdrafts up to a certain amount. Let ￿ D : [0;T] ￿ ￿ ! [0;1)n be
de￿ned by ￿ D(t;!) = ( ￿ D1(t;!);:::; ￿ Dn(t;!)), where ￿ Di(t;!) is a net debit cap for bank
i at time t and in state !. Though a net debit cap contradicts the very philosophy
of real-time gross settlement systems, it is still an available intraday monetary policy.
Finally, let zij(t;!) > 0 be the amount of the collateralized loan received by bank i
from the Central Bank at time t and state ! in order to full￿l its payment obligations
toward bank j. Whenever zij(t;!) < 0, we say that bank i is paying back a loan.
De￿ne zi(t;!) =
P
j2B zij(t;!): We require that
R T
0 zi(t;!)d￿(t) = 0, ￿ ￿ a:e:, that is,
by the end of the day, every loan is payed back. Let ￿ = (Bo; ￿ D;z) be the parameter
pro￿le and assume that there is a compact set ￿ ￿ [0;1)n ￿ L1(￿;E￿)2 such that
￿ 2 ￿. In order to make the role of the parameters explicit, we may write the constraint
correspondence ￿ as ￿￿. For simplicity, de￿ne gi(t;!) = Bi
o + ￿ Di(t;!) + zi(t;!), and let
g(t;!) = (g1(t;!);:::;gn(t;!)): The terms in the de￿nition of g will be called intraday
monetary policies. The set-valued map ￿￿ represents the constraint set that any bank
has to satisfy in an RTGS system.
A settlement function ￿ 2 L1(￿;K) is q-feasible if, given q 2 K; ￿ is a Bochner-
integrable selection of the set-valued map ￿￿(￿;q) : [0;T] ￿ K, i.e., ￿(t) 2 ￿￿(t;q),
8t 2 [0;T]: The interpretation of q-feasibility is straightforward. At any given time t, a
settlement function ￿ is q-feasible if it can settle some of the payments at time t given that
the settlement function q is the settlement function that had been in place up to time t.
The settlement function ￿ 2 L1(￿;K) is feasible if ￿ is ￿-feasible, i.e., ￿(t) 2 ￿￿(t;￿(t)),
8t 2 [0;T]: The set FIX(￿￿) = ff 2 L1(￿;K) : f(t) 2 ￿￿(t;f(t));8t 2 [0;T]g is called
the set of random ￿xed points of ￿￿: Then a settlement function ￿ is feasible if it is a
random ￿xed point of the constraint set-valued map ￿￿: In other words, ￿ is feasible if
￿ 2 FIX(￿￿), i.e., if ￿(t) 2 ￿￿(t;￿(t));8t 2 [0;T].
4Given two nonempty sets, X and Y , we prefer to use the notation ￿ : X ￿ Y for a correspondence
instead of the more cumbersome notation ￿ : X ! 2Y , where 2Y is the set of subsets of Y .









where hL1(￿;E);L1(￿;E￿)i is the duality pairing of settlements and payments, ￿￿ :
[0;T] ￿ K ￿ K is the set-valued random operator of RTGS constraints, and ￿ is the set
of intraday monetary policies.


















Since initial balances held at Central Bank accounts are ￿xed, this is equivalent to
maximizing the total expected value of the ￿ ow of outgoing payments (the second term
in the de￿nition of ￿). In other words, the Central Bank wants to solve:
8
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8i 2 B;8t 2 [0;T];￿ ￿ a:e:
In other words, the problem is:
(P)
￿
sup￿2L1(￿;K) x ￿ ￿
s:t ￿ 2 FIX(￿￿)
A solution to the problem (P) above is called an optimal settlement function.
The left-hand side of the constraint is the total value of outgoing payments from bank
i at time t and state !. The second term on right-hand side is the net transfer up to time
t to bank i￿ s account. The ￿rst term refers to any intraday monetary policy speci￿c to
bank i. The objective function is total out￿ ow of payments.
Consider the Central Bank￿ s liquidity problem, sup￿2L1(￿;K)fx ￿ ￿ : ￿ 2 FIX(￿￿)g.
The indicator function of FIX(￿￿) ￿ W is given by:
 FIX(￿￿)(￿) =
￿
0 if ￿ 2 FIX(￿￿)
1 if ￿ = 2 FIX(￿￿)
Then (P) is equivalent to inf￿2L1(￿;K)f￿x￿￿+ FIX(￿￿)(￿)g: Let f(￿) = ￿x￿￿+ FIX(￿￿)(￿):
A settlement function ￿￿ is optimal if 0 2 @f(￿￿) = ￿x + NFIX(￿￿)(￿￿). In other words,
￿￿ is an optimal settlement function if x 2 NFIX(￿￿)(￿￿). Here, NFIX(￿￿)(￿) = f& 2
L1(￿;E￿) : & ￿ ￿ ￿ 0;8￿ 2 TFIX(￿￿)(￿￿)g is the normal cone to FIX(￿￿) at ￿￿ and
5TFIX(￿￿)(￿￿) = f￿ 2 L1(￿;E) : do





￿;￿) = lim sup
y!￿￿;￿#0
dFIX(￿￿)(y + ￿￿) ￿ dFIX(￿￿)(y)
￿
and dFIX(￿￿)(y) = inffky ￿ ￿k : ￿ 2 FIX(￿￿)g:
Theorem (Peæaloza, 2009): Assume that ￿￿(￿;q) : [0;T] ￿ K is (B([0;T]);W)-
measurable, , 8q 2 K, where W is the Borel-￿-algebra generated by the weak topology on
K and assume, in addition, that it is closed-valued and, 8t 2 [0;T]; ￿￿(t;￿) : K ￿ K is
nonexpansive, i.e., H(￿￿(t;p);￿￿(t;q)) ￿ m(p;q); 8p;q 2 K, where H is the Hausdor⁄
metric on 2K induced by the metric m on K. Then there exists an optimal settlement
function, ￿￿; that solves (P), i.e., argsupfx ￿ ￿ : ￿ 2 FIX(￿￿)g 6= ;: Moreover, ￿￿
satis￿es x 2 NFIX(￿￿)(￿￿), where NFIX(￿￿)(￿) is the normal cone to FIX(￿￿) at ￿￿.
We refer to Peæaloza (2009) for proofs and detailed interpretations.
3 Implementation of optimal settlement rules
Next, we show that the optimal settlement function can be implemented by an op-
timization routine related to reordering and splitting of payments. We call it simply
￿-routine. The Greek letter ￿ stands for routine.
De￿nition: Let x 2 L1(￿;E￿) be a payments function, where xi = ￿i(Qi(t)); 8i 2 B,
is a reordering of the set Qi(t) = fxi;j1(t);:::;xi;jn(t)g of outgoing payments from bank i
at time t. The settlement function ￿ 2 L1(￿;E) is a ￿-routine if:
￿i1(t;!) = ￿[0;Bi
o+Ni(t;!)+ ￿ Di(t;!)+zi1(t;!)](xi1(t;!))
8t 2 [0;T]; ￿ ￿ a:e: (for i 6= 1); and, for j ￿ 2 :
￿ij(t;!) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if ￿ik(t;!) = 1; 8k ￿ j ￿ 1; and
xij(t;!) ￿ Bi







If i = 1, we start with ￿i2 and then de￿ne ￿ij recursively.
After reordering the set of outgoing payments, the ￿rst payment is settled if, and only
if, the bank has enough funds. Then the second payment is settled if, and only if, the
￿rst payment has been settled and the bank has enough funds, and so on.
6Now we will de￿ne a ￿-routine with the additional feature that splitting of payments
is allowed. The advantage of splitting is that we can combine it with a settlement rule as
simple as the ￿-routine in such a way that the optimal settlement function is attained.
We need some de￿nitions. Given any two n-matrices, x = (xij) and ￿ = (￿ij); the
algebraic operation x￿￿ yields a n-matrix y = (yij) given by y = x￿￿ = (xij￿ij), that
is, a matrix y with entries yij = xij￿ij.
De￿nition: We say that the settlement function ￿￿ 2 L1(￿;E) satis￿es the (￿;￿)-
routine if, 8t 2 [0;T] and ￿-a.e., there exists a ￿-routine ￿ and positive numbers ￿ij(t;!) 2
(0;1]; 8i;j 2 B, such that ￿￿(t;!) = ￿(t;!)￿￿(t;!); where ￿(t;!) = (￿ij(t;!)).
The Greek letter ￿ stands for splitting. The next theorem shows how an optimal
random time-invariant settlement function can be implemented through a (￿;￿)-routine.
Most payment systems in the world adopt the FIFO rule with prioritization together
with a netting device that is used whenever gridlock is imminent. Some other countries
adopt instead the bypass FIFO rule. From a practical point of view, these rules are
justi￿ed to the extent that they help reduce aggregate liquidity requirements in the system.
Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of view, aggregate liquidity is truly minimized if
splitting of payments were allowed together with an optimization routine as simple as
FIFO with reordering. A (￿;￿)-routine is the translation of FIFO with reordering in
RTGS systems with queueing to a system without queueing. If we reinterpret the set of
outgoing payments from bank i at time t as the set of queued outgoing payments, then
(￿;￿)-routine reduces to a FIFO rule with reordering.
Theorem: Given an RTGS system ￿ = fhL1(￿;E);L1(￿;E￿)i;(￿￿)￿2￿g, let ￿￿ be
an optimal settlement function for ￿: Then ￿￿ can be implemented by a (￿;￿)-routine.
Proof: Given the RTGS system ￿ = fhL1(￿;E);L1(￿;E￿)i;(￿￿)￿2￿g; consider a
payments function x 2 L1(￿;E￿) and a parameter of intraday credit policies ￿ 2 ￿. Let
￿￿ 2 L1(￿;K) be an optimal settlement function for ￿￿ = fhL1(￿;E);L1(￿;E￿)i;￿￿g:
For each ￿￿





i￿i(1)(t;!) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿













i￿i(n)(t;!)) and de￿ne ￿i = ￿
￿1
i (￿￿
i): Notice that by de￿nition,
￿￿
ii(t;!) = 0; so ￿￿
ii(t;!) = 1: Let ￿
+
i = maxf￿i(j) : ￿￿
i￿i(j)(t;!) > 0g: Take any (￿;￿)-
routine such that ￿i(t;!) = (1;:::;1;0;::;0) with 1 on the ￿rst ￿
+
i entries and 0 on the
7last n ￿ ￿
+
i entries. Then, by construction, ￿￿(t;!) = ￿(t;!)￿￿(t;!), that is, ￿￿ can be
implemented by the (￿;￿)-routine. Proceed the same way for any payments function x
and parameter of intraday credit policies ￿: ￿
4 Conclusion
Peæaloza (2009) constructed a model of real-time gross settlement systems in which
interbank payments and settlement rules are linked by a dual relationship represented by
the bracket duality between the space of payments and the space of settlements. Here
we showed how the optimal settlement rule can be implemented. Of course it is not that
simple in the real world, but we believe we made a point in favor of optimization routines
by showing that reordering and splitting of payments enhance the speed of the ￿ ow of
payments and help minimize liquidity needs within the system.
The in￿nite-dimensional linear programming formulation of the optimal design of pay-
ment systems opens the door to many future possible extensions and qualitative analysis
in terms of the dual problem related to the maximization of the out￿ ow of payments.
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